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1 Introduction 
Measures agreed by the Council in June 2003, envisage a basic reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). With the new measures the CAP moves towards producer 
(income) subsidies instead of subsidizing production. Reduction of institutional prices, and 
replacement (of the significant part) of the existing and certain newly introduced direct 
payments with a single decoupled payment all point to that direction. The new payments are 
based on reference data, and because of the already compulsory cross-compliance, they are 
available only on condition that certain environmental, animal welfare food security and 
quality standards are met. The scope of rural development measures is widening and as 
modulation provides an opportunity to re-allocate resources, the total fund available for rural 
development is growing. If the CAP budget threatens to exceed the budget ceilings agreed in 
October 2002, a new financial discipline can be invoked to scale down payments. 
Our paper focuses on the key element of the reform: on the single farm payment. The 
basic aim was to decouple direct payment from production decisions.  Because of the 
widespread agricultural policy reforms (support producers with the least possible distortions) 
and of the on-going WTO negotiations, this is an issue attracting significant attention on 
behalf of agricultural economists. The principle is that policies should not distort decision 
making by producers and markets should adjust as if there were no policy in place. Different 
tools and different methodologies have been employed in the effort to better understand and 
rank policy measures in terms of their production and trade effects. Most of the literature 
classifies measures based on implementation criteria. Our paper assesses the decoupled nature 
of the single farm payment (SFP) based on WTO and OECD criteria. 
  2Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the concept of the Single Farm 
Payment. Section 3 overviews the most important decoupling concepts. In Section 4 we 
confront the single farm payment (SFP) with the decoupling criteria described in Section 3, 
and finally there are some concluding remarks (Section 5). 
 
2 The single farm payment as a key element of the 2003 June CAP reform 
The most radical feature of the June 2003 CAP reform agreement is the decoupling of 
subsidies from production and their replacement by one farm payment, known as the Single 
Farm Payment (SFP). The new payments are based on reference data, and because of the 
already compulsory cross-compliance, they are available only on condition that certain 
environmental, animal welfare food security and quality standards are met. Through the 
instrument of modulation member countries can reduce the SFP for bigger farms up to 5 
percent in order to finance additional rural development measures. If the CAP budget 
threatens to exceed the budget ceilings agreed in October 2002, a new financial discipline can 
be invoked to scale down payments. 
 
Table 1: Maximum rate of coupled support, selected products 
 
Supported product  Maximum rate of coupled support (%) 
Cereals and oilseeds  25 
Rice  42 
Protein crops (supplementary)  100 
Sheep   50 
Beef 
Option 1 
             Slaughter Premium 
             Suckler Cow Premium 
Option 2 
             Slaughter Premium 
Option 3 
             Special Beef Premium 
 
 
40 
100 
 
100 
 
75 
 
Decoupling has been made less strict than the European Commission originally proposed. 
Member states can choose for a delay of its introduction until 2007 instead of 2005. More 
  3important, member states are enabled to limit decoupling of income payments for a number of 
products, as they have the possibility to maintain a proportion of coupled policies (See Table 
1).  
As a new element the 2003 CAP reforms have provided a large space for national 
manoeuvre. The following elements of the reform fall within national competence: 
–  possibility of partial decoupling; 
–  determination of the date of introduction (2005-2007); 
–  re-allocation a part of the support through the national envelope; 
–  limited freedom to select the single farm payment (SFP) calculation model 
(historic, regional or hybrid). 
As regards the SFP model there are two basic approaches. The historic model creates 
entitlements to support based on the average level of subsidies claimed in the livestock and 
arable sectors during the 2000-2002 reference period. The number of entitlements allocated to 
each farmer is set equal to the average area of land giving rise to subsidy plus all pasture land 
during that same period. The value of each of these entitlements is established by dividing the 
average amount of subsidy claimed by the farmer by the number of entitlements awarded. 
The regional (area based) model operates by basing entitlements to farmers on the area 
of eligible land that they declare in their 2005 Integrated Administration and Control Scheme 
(IACS) returns. The value of all entitlements within a region would be set at a single, 
common rate. However, it is possible to create a third approach to decoupling by combining 
the historic and regional approaches into what is termed a hybrid model. This can be done in 
different ways to create various forms of hybrid. However, there are two broad hybrid classes 
– horizontal and vertical. A horizontal hybrid is created by putting a set proportion of the 
decoupled budget arising from each coupled regime into a regional element, with the balance 
of the budget allocated according to historical claims patterns. A vertical hybrid is created by 
  4putting specific coupled schemes, or proportions thereof, into the area-based component, with 
the balance allocated according to historical claims patterns. Also the ratio of regional and 
historical elements of hybrid models can vary in later years. If the ratios do not change in the 
future the model is static, while if the model incorporates changing ratios the model is 
dynamic.  Models chosen by member states are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: National implementation models 
 
 Historical  Regional  Static 
hybrid 
Dynamic 
hybrid 
Maximum possible coupling  F      
Partial decoupling  A, B, GR, I, NL, P, 
E, GB (Scotland) 
M, SLO  DK, S  SF, D 
“Full” decoupling  IRL, GB (Wales)    L, GB 
(NIRL) 
GB (England) 
Source: Halmai, 2004 
 
5 Basic questions of decoupling 
5.1 Different concepts of decoupling 
The term decoupling is used for agricultural policy measures that do not affect relative 
prices of agricultural commodities or of the inputs used to produce them.  
According to the final communiqué of OECD agricultural ministers’ 1987 meeting 
market forces should be left to determine equilibrium prices and quantities. Policies should 
not distort decision making by producers (or consumers) and markets should adjust as if there 
were no policy in place. This restrictive concept of decoupling corresponds to the definition of 
a full decoupling given by Cahill (1997). (The agricultural policy measure “does not influence 
production decisions of farmers receiving payments, and it permits free market determination 
of prices for all producers receiving or not payments”. This approach focuses on the 
adjustment process and not only on equilibrium values. Under this definition, the policy can 
be considered fully decoupled if the demand and supply functions remain unchanged after the 
introduction of the measure in question. There is no change in equilibrium prices and 
  5quantities, and there is no difference in the response of the market to any exogenous shock 
arising on the demand or the supply side. 
Requirement of decoupling is an important element of rules on domestic support in the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).  The so-called green box measures (for details see 
AoA Annex II) were not taken into account when the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) 
was calculated. A key feature of these measures is that they have no, or at most minimal, 
trade-distorting effects or effects on production. The support excluded from reduction 
commitments shall be provided through a publicly-funded government programme (including 
government revenue foregone) not involving transfers from consumers (Annex II, points 2-
13); and the support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to 
producers; and they should also comply with certain subsidy specific criteria. International 
literature usually focuses on direct income support for producers.  Annex II of the AoA 
defines decoupled income support in the following way:  
−  Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly-defined criteria such as 
income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a defined and 
fixed base period.  
−  The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the 
type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any 
year after the base period.  
−  The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the 
prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after 
the base period.  
−  The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the 
factors of production employed in any year after the base period.  
−  No production shall be required in order to receive such payments. 
  6These are the most commonly referred criteria of decoupling. (In fact, logics of the 
Agreement suggests, that all measures listed in Annex II, including the stockholding for the 
purpose of food security, domestic food aid, support for income security etc., can be classified 
as decoupled.) 
The  AoA defined the criteria of decoupling based on the nature and design of the 
measures. However, the same policy may result in different effects.  E.g.: the same policy 
may result in different effects when implemented in different locations (Gohin – Guyomard – 
Le Mouël, 1999). 
In fact, the impact on production and trade of a given policy is of great importance. It is 
not enough then to analyse only the design of a decoupled policy. It is essential to explore the 
effects of different agricultural policy measures having regard decoupling.  
OECD defines decoupling in terms of policy effects (OECD, 2001a). This approach 
results in more restrictive definitions, and makes difference between full and effective full 
decoupling. (The following descriptions rest strongly on OECD analyses.)  
According to the equilibrium approach decoupled measures do not have trade and 
production effects or they are at most minimal. Effective full decoupling does not result in a 
production level exceeding the one without the applied measure (Cahill, 1997). The measure 
may affect decisions of producers but does not result in higher production.  
In fact, the package of tightly coupled measures should be examined. The package could 
have a zero net effect on equilibrium prices and quantities, even if the individual measures 
have a significant impact on equilibrium prices and quantities. (This is the case, e.g. when the 
production effect of a coupled payment is offset by a quantity restriction. A similar situation 
occurs when the same measure covers several products and the effect may be different 
product by product.) 
  7An effective fully decoupled policy package (with a zero net effect on production) is not 
necessarily fully decoupled in the restrictive sense: they may have significantly different 
supply responses to exogenous shocks. (In this restrictive sense, zero market price support 
does not mean full decoupling of price support measures.) 
The term effective in that way refers to the less restrictive equilibrium concept of 
decoupling. Full decoupling however, reflects the more restrictive adjustment concept. 
(Different concepts of decoupling are summarized in Table 3.) According to Cahil (1997) a 
policy is fully decoupled if it does not influence production decisions of farmers receiving 
payments, and if it permits free market determination of prices. That is, full decoupling is a 
very restrictive concept that requires no change in the way farmers and consumers take 
decisions. 
 
Table 3: Different concepts of decoupling 
 
DECOUPLED DESIGN 
−  The measure is part of a government funded program. 
−  The support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to producers. 
−  The measure should also comply with certain subsidy specific criteria: payments are based on 
clearly-defined criteria; shall not be related to, or based on, the type or volume of production 
undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period; shall not be related to the prices 
applying to any production undertaken in any year after the base period; shall not be related 
to the factors of production employed in any year after the base period and no production 
shall be required. 
DECOUPLED EFFECT 
Full decoupling 
There are no production and trade effects. 
Effective full decoupling 
Does not result in a production level exceeding the one prevailing without the measure. 
 
4.2 Possible impacts of agricultural policy measures 
It is very difficult to rank production and trade impacts of alternative policies. Countries 
implement a complex system of support measures, making difficult the empirical analysis. 
  8The mechanisms by which policies can affect production and trade (OECD, 2001a) could be 
grouped as:  
−  Static effects. Whenever policies affect the prices of an agricultural output or input, there is 
a static production and trade effect. However, policies affecting only farm income — and 
not affecting prices — may also have static effects on production whenever markets work 
imperfectly or farmers make decisions under binding constraints.  
−  Effects under uncertainty. If farmers are risk averse, all policies reducing risk and/or 
increasing farm income may have additional effects on production and trade. 
−  Dynamic effects. Investments made in a supported framework affect production decisions 
in the following years. In addition, if there is uncertainty about future agricultural policies, 
present policies and government decisions may affect farmers’ expectations of future 
policies and through these channels may affect current production decisions. Complex 
policy packages could easily affect farmers’ expectations and the responsiveness of 
farmers to market shocks and policy changes. 
The static relative price effects have a decisive role in assessing the effective degree of 
decoupling. The effects associated with risk and dynamics are more likely to be significant for 
assessing the degree of responsiveness with respect to external shocks.  
All these static, dynamic and risk mechanisms are cumulative and can occur 
simultaneously in response to a single measure. Under this broad framework of analysis, it 
seems difficult to design a policy measure not having some production or trade effects. 
 
4.3 Measuring the degree of decoupling 
The concept of the degree of decoupling is an attempt to measure the production and 
trade impacts of different measures (OECD, 2001a). All policies affecting relative prices of 
  9inputs or outputs have a direct effect on producers’ decisions and they affect resource 
allocation.  
It is very difficult to explore the above mentioned effects. Based on a partial equilibrium 
model Gohin, Guyomard and De Mouël (1999) conclude that only payments based on fixed 
product-specific inputs are fully decoupled. Payments based on the use of land are coupled to 
the extent they affect the allocation of land.  
Under the Policy Evaluation Matrix (PEM) pilot project, the OECD (1999) shows that the 
effects on production of payments based on the most rigid input are smaller than those 
induced by payments based on output. But both are smaller than those induced by payments 
based on the most elastic input. This result is consistent with Gohin et al. (1999) and with the 
empirical studies of Cahill (1997), Moro and Sckokai (1998), Guyomard et al (1996) and Lin 
and Washington (1997).  
Findings of the OECD PEM model (OECD, 2003a) show that payments based on the use 
of variable inputs and those based on output (market price support and output payments) are 
the categories with the greatest impact on production and trade. Conversely, payments based 
on acreage are the most decoupled form of support. Furthermore, the impact of such 
payments is all the lower where there is no obligation to grow specific crops on eligible land 
in order to receive the support. Finally, the study also reveals a positive correlation between 
the degree of decoupling of the relevant categories of measure and their efficiency in terms of 
income transfer to producers. 
The latest results of the PEM model show that payments based on historical entitlements 
have the smallest market distorting effects, which are significantly lower than that of area 
based subsidies. This means that the degree of decoupling is the highest for this category. The 
latest sensitivity analyses (carried out in 2005) show similar results.  
  10These analyses suggest that more decoupled forms of agricultural support are less 
distorting and they provide more efficient income transfer than the traditional output based 
subsidies. (Martini – Anton – Dewbre, 2005.) 
 
4 Assessment of the SFP based on WTO and OECD decoupling criteria 
In this chapter we confront the single farm payment (SFP) with the decoupling criteria 
described in Section 3.  
 
4.1 Assessment of the SFP based on WTO decoupling criteria 
During the midterm review of the CAP WTO concerns became crucial. The Commission 
(2002) acknowledges that there is a need to preserve farming incomes in a less trade distorting 
way, and decoupling of direct payments is seen the solution to that problem. The introduction 
of the SFP results in a reduction in the link between the payments and production. The EU 
argues that the payments do not distort trade and therefore should be placed in the green box. 
The  WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) defines the green box criteria in the 
following way.   
1. They have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production. 
As the previous section suggests, payments based on acreage (and especially those based 
on historical entitlements) are the most decoupled forms of support. In that way they have no 
or at most minimal trade and production distorting effects. Furthermore, the impact of such 
payments is all the lower where there is no obligation to grow specific crops on eligible land 
in order to receive the support. SFP meets both criteria.  
 
2. As the SFP is financed from the EU budget, it meets the criteria that payments shall be 
provided through a publicly-funded government program not involving transfers from 
consumers.  
  113. The SFP does not have the effect of providing price support to producers.  
4. Payments should also comply with certain subsidy specific criteria. As regards direct 
income support Annex II of the AoA defines decoupled income support in the following way.  
4a) Payments are based on clearly-defined criteria. 
It was expected that single farm payment brings a significant simplification of the support 
system. However, different de-coupling models and the possibility of partial de-coupling have 
resulted in a very complex system with a wide range of national diversities (See Figure 1).  
 
                  
Source: Swinbank, 2005. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the SFP system 
 
What is more, rather than determine payments for the farm on the basis of that farm’s 
historic claims, regionalized schemes can apply. All of the money that would have been paid 
in a particular region (or country) can be pooled, and then paid on a flat rate basis on all 
eligible land in the region (with or without combination of arable and livestock payments) 
(Swinbank, 2005). The picture is more complicated if a hybrid of these to basic systems is 
applied.  
  124b) Payments shall not be related to, or based on, the type or volume of production 
undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period.  
There are two shortcomings of the SFP as regards this point. First, the farmer in 
subsequent years would have to remain in agriculture and show that the land is still farmed or 
kept in good agricultural and environmental condition. Second, land on which fruit and 
vegetables were grown, or which was planted to permanent crops (e.g. orchards) could not be 
used to claim the SFP.  
4c) Payments shall not be related to the prices applying to any production undertaken in 
any year after the base period. (See above at green box criteria.) 
4d) Payments shall not be related to the factors of production employed in any year after 
the base period and no production shall be required. 
It is very difficult to design a policy which does not influence the future use of inputs. 
Even when payments are based on historical acres and yields, expectations of the eventual 
reassessment of those bases can cause farmers to retain land in production of particular crops 
(See e.g.: OECD, 20005). Similarly, safety-net policies that reduce the downside risk of 
fluctuations in income clearly can have an effect of keeping resources in farming (Josling, 
2004). 
 
4.2 Assessment of the SFP based on OECD decoupling “criteria” 
According to the equilibrium approach decoupled measures do not have trade and 
production effects or they are at most minimal. Effective full decoupling does not result in a 
production level exceeding the one without the applied measure. The measure may affect 
decisions of producers but does not result in higher production 
Both the results of the PEM analysis (OECD, 2005) and analysis on transfer efficiency 
(OECD, 2002) suggest that the SFP seems to be an efficient choice. It is efficient as it 
  13provides only minimal distortions and can meet the simultaneous requirement of income 
support of domestic producers and minimal distortions with the smallest cost. 
As even decoupled programs can have indirect effects on farm production decisions and 
aggregate output, the system of SFP can not be considered as fully decoupled. 
 
7 Concluding remarks 
During the mid-term review the European Union (EU) made a significant step in the 
direction of a more transparent and less trade distorting agricultural policy. The 2003 reform 
of the CAP constitutes a major change in the way direct payments are made in the EU. The 
introduction of the SFP results in a reduction in the link between the payments and 
production. The EU argues that the payments do not distort trade and therefore should be 
placed in the WTO green box as a decoupled income support. Based on our analysis, this 
seems to be possible, as the SFP meets not only the current WTO (design based) criteria of 
decoupling, but can also be qualified as effective fully decoupled system using the OECD 
terminology.  
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